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AbstrAct
The domineering opinion during the Cold War, especially in the domestic and 
foreign propaganda of the Soviet Union, was that Hitler started World War II by 
attacking Poland and that Germany’s attack against the USSR in summer 1941 
was nothing but deceitful aggression against the peace-loving socialist nation. 
Although the pact made between the Soviet Union and Germany on the 23rd of 
August 1939 was not denied in the Soviet Union (what was denied, however, was 
the existence of its secret protocol), it was presented as an attempt by the Soviet 
Union to buy time and avoid war. The attack against Poland in 1939 was treated 
as reunification of the Western-Ukrainian and Belarusian nations with their 
compatriots. What really happened was that eastern Polish territories, which had 
been placed under the influence of the Soviet Union with the secret protocols 
to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, were seized as a result of the military attack 
launched by the Red Army on the 17th of September 1939. Conquering the Bal-
tic States and Bessarabia in summer 1940 was presented as domestic socialist 
revolutions. These countries had also been placed under the influence of the 
Soviet Union with the secret protocols of the same pact. The Soviet Union forced 
the Baltic States to surrender and Romania to give up Bessarabia by threatening 
military action. The Baltic States were then occupied with the support of the 
weapons of the Red Army and the Baltic Navy and incorporated into the Soviet 
Union.
The archive documents that became accessible after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union have helped to prove that specific plans for a preventive attack against 
Germany had been prepared by spring 1941. One of the reasons for the massive 
losses suffered by the Red Army in 1941 was the fact that Germany managed 
to hit it with its attack before the Red Army had completed its preparations for 
attack.
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World War II, which lasted from 1939 to 1945, was one of the most tragic 
events of the past century and its aftermath can still be felt today. Much 
has been written about the causes, course and consequences of the war 
in the almost 70 years that have passed since its occurrence, and these 
writings contain various analyses of the war as one of the bloodiest and 
most tragic events in human history that still lacks an unbiased com-
mon denominator. Unfortunately, political views have left their mark on 
the studies of the outbreak, course and results of the war. Two different 
visions have been presented to the international public. On one side is 
the more or less realistic approach of the democratic world that is based 
on documents and puts the blame on two totalitarian states in Europe – 
Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union, because both of them had 
the ambition to rule the world, or at least Europe. On the other side is 
the official interpretation of history by the Soviet Union, which is still 
popular in Russia and regards the USSR as the victim and Germany as the 
aggressor. The book “Falsifiers of History”, edited and partially re-written 
by the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, was published in 1948 and became 
the basis of the official approach to the Second World War by the Soviet 
Union.1 It was used during the Soviet era and the positions it represents 
are still widespread in Russia. Moscow has consistently accused the West, 
especially the Baltic States, of falsification of history. The information war 
where the latter are also accused of nationalism and fascism strength-
ened suddenly after former KGB officer Vladimir Putin was elected the 
President of Russia in 2000, and it has become particularly hysterical in 
the last decade when Putin and his team started restoring Russia’s con-
trol over post-Soviet countries. This is evident in Russia’s new doctrine;2 
foreign and internal policies; the mass media aimed at giving disinforma-
tion to the international public, its own people and the Russians living in 
1 Фальсификаторы истории (историческая справка): по поводу опубликования Гос. 
департаментом США архивных материалов Герм. м-ва иностр. дел «Нацистско-
советские отношения 1939–41 гг.», Советское информационное бюро (Ленинград: 
Госполитиздат, 1948).
2 Виталий Аверьянов и Роман Багдасаров, Новая русская доктрина: Пора расправить 
крылья (Москва: Яуза, 2010).
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the  Baltic States; and the frequent defamation campaigns against Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania.
On the 20th of May 2009, the President of the Russian Federation 
Dmitri Medvedev signed the decree “Presidential Commission of the 
Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detri-
ment of Russia’s Interests”. The Commission’s tasks included “[---] devel-
opment of guidelines for the presentation of the truth and real historical 
facts to the public and counteraction to the politicised interpretation of 
these facts”.3 President Medvedev’s decree unleashed another one of Rus-
sia’s propaganda campaigns in support of the Stalinist approach to the 
history of World War II. Its main arguments are as follows:
•	 the	 peace-loving	 Soviet	 Union	 never	 planned	 to	 ‘export’	 the	
socialist revolution to Europe with the support of the bayonets of 
the Red Army, later the Soviet Army. Using force against neigh-
bouring countries and occupying them in the 1930s and 1940s 
was necessary in order to ensure the state’s security;
•	 Stalin	was	not	one	of	the	architects	of	World	War	II	–	he	made	
every effort to prevent it;
•	 the	 joint	 campaign	of	 Stalin	 and	Hitler	 against	Poland	was	not	
a war as far as the Soviet Union was concerned – it was “the lib-
eration campaign of the Red Army for reuniting the people of 
Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, who were suffering the 
oppression of Poland, with the big and friendly family of the 
Soviet nations”;
•	 the	Red	Army	did	not	attack	Finland	in	November	1939	in	order	
to conquer the country, and what occurred was “a local armed 
conflict between the USSR and Finland”, which was not a part of 
World War II.
•	 The	Soviet	Union	did	not	occupy	Estonia,	Latvia	and	Lithuania;	
these nations wanted to get rid of capitalist bloodsuckers and vol-
unteered	to	join	the	Soviet	Union;
3 Елена Новоселова, “Правда о войне и мире: Как государство собирается бороться с 
фальсификацией истории,” Российская Газета (Федеральный выпуск), 20.5.2009.
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•	 World	War	 II	was	 a	 conflict	 between	 imperialist	 countries	 and	
the Soviet Union had nothing to do with – it only fought against 
Germany in the Great Patriotic War after the latter had suddenly 
attacked it;
•	 Stalin	and	the	General	Staff	of	the	Red	Army	did	not	plan	a	stra-
tegic offensive against Germany in 1940–1941; they simply tried 
to increase the defence capability of the Soviet Union as much as 
possible;
•	 the	Red	Army	was	considerably	weaker	in	1941	than	the	German	
Wehrmacht and not prepared to fight off this unexpected aggres-
sion. This was the cause of the military catastrophe in the first 
stage of the war as well as the mass casualties and material losses;
•	 the	 Red	 Army	 and	 the	 NKVD	 (Народный комиссариат 
внутренных дел – the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs – 
author’s note) never committed any crimes against humanity in 
the Great Patriotic War. On the contrary, they were the noble lib-
erators of European nations from Hitler’s occupation.
As the archives of the Ministry of Defence of the USSR were closed during 
the Soviet period, many researchers, incl. West-European ones, adopted 
certain positions of the Stalinist approach to history. However, many of 
them	doubted	its	objectivity.	It’s	true	that	a	limited	amount	of	second-rate	
confidential material, which concerned military planning in the Soviet 
Union from 1939–1940, was published in the 1950s when Nikita Khrush-
chev was the leader of the USSR, but this material didn’t give a compre-
hensive overview of how Stalin and his henchmen planned to conquer the 
world or what their military activity was like at the time. The first person 
to question the official approach of the Soviet Union to the history of the 
Second World War, especially the preparation and initiation of the war as 
well as the main culprit, was former officer of the Main Intelligence Direc-
torate (Главное разведывательное управление  – GRU) of the USSR 
Viktor Rezun-Suvorov, who defected to the West. He compared known 
historical facts and figures with the official data of Russia and came to the 
conclusion that the latter had been falsified. He published his findings in 
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the well-known book “Icebreaker”4 and in his later works. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the short period of openness and 
democracy in Russia that followed in the 1990s led to the partial open-
ing of the archive of the Russian Ministry of Defence that contained the 
most confidential documents about the Second World War. This allowed 
the historians who managed to access the archive (Pavel Aptekar, Mikhail 
Meltyukhov, Tatyana Bushuyeva, Mark Solonin, Boris Sokolov, Dmitri 
Khmelnitski, Alexander Gogun, Yuri Felshtinsky, Alexander, Lev Lopuk-
hovski, Vladimir Beshanov, etc.) to reveal a large extent of the truth about 
the military affairs of the Soviet Union from 1939–1940.
The seeds of the Second World War were sown by the consequences 
of the First World War, when the Russian Empire disappeared and power 
was seized by the Bolsheviks, who dreamt of a socialist revolution and a 
worldwide Soviet Union. In 1918, their leader Vladimir Ulyanov-Lenin 
explained his ambitions as follows: “Russia will now become the first 
country where the socialist order has been established. [---] But it’s not 
about Russia alone – I spit at it, my dear comrades – it’s only a stage we’re 
going through on our way to world revolution”.5 The 5th All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets approved the constitution of the state on the 10th 
of July 1918. Its Article 3 stipulated as follows: “Bearing in mind as its 
fundamental problem the abolition of the exploitation of men by men, 
the entire abolition of the division of the people into classes, the suppres-
sion of exploiters, the establishment of a socialist society, and the victory 
of socialism in all lands.[---]”.6 The international union of communist 
parties – the Communist International (Comintern) – was formed for 
the establishment of the worldwide Soviet Union. It was managed from 
Moscow	and	its	task	was	to	‘export’	the	socialist	revolution.	One	example	
4 Виктор Суворов, Ледокол; День «М» (Москва: АСТ, 1998).
5 Георгий Соломон, Среди красных вождей: лично пережитое и виденное на советской 
службе (Париж: Мишень, 1930), т. 1, 15.
6 Конституция (Основной Закон) Российской Социалистической Федеративной 
Советской Республики (принята V Всероссийским Съездом Советов в заседании от 10 




intern in Estonia on the 1st of December 1924.
Stalin considered himself a disciple of Lenin and a follower of Lenin’s 
ideas about a world revolution and a worldwide Soviet Union. In the 
1930s he finally worked out his strategy for the next period in history:
•	 World	War	II	was	 the	precondition	 for	a	 successful	communist	
world revolution – western countries needed to clash with each 
other, fight each other. The Soviet Union was to remain neutral 
during the first stage of World War II;
•	 the	war	between	western	countries	had	to	last	as	long	as	possible	
to ensure the warring sides used up their resources to the full. 
That’s when the Red Army was to get involved in the war.7 
The Treaty of Versailles, which ended the First World War, was very 
harsh on Germany and created the necessary preconditions for the coun-
try’s radicalisation, revanchism and the Nazis coming to power in 1933. 
In the 1920s the leader of the Nazis Adolf Hitler expressed their credo in 
his book “Mein Kampf ”: “When we speak about new lands and territories 
in Europe, the first thing we do is look at Russia and also the countries 
situated in its neighbourhood and dependent on Russia”.8 
Once their global goals were clear, both dictators commenced the 
feverish militarisation of their countries in order to achieve them. The 
Soviet Union, which Stalin had turned into a slave camp, was more suc-
cessful in this. The Red Army grew from 631,000 soldiers in 1930 to 
1,033,570 soldiers in 1934. The number of aircraft increased from 1,149 to 
4,354 and the number of tanks from 92 to 7,574. On the eve of the Second 
World War, the Red Army had accumulated 1,931,962 soldiers, 10,362 
aircraft and 21,110 tanks.9 The achievements of the German Wehrmacht, 
7 Виктор Суворов, Андрей Буровский и др., Союз звезды со свастикой: Встречная 
агрессия (Москва: Яуза Пресс, 2011), 165–166.
8 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (München: F. Eher, 1933), 742.
9 Михаил Мельтюхов, Упущенный шанс Сталина. Советский Союз и борьба за Европу: 
1939–1941 (документы, факты, суждения) (Москва: Вече, 2000), 349, 358, 359, 600 (Tables 
27, 28, 30, 31).
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which was preparing for a war with Poland, were considerably more 
modest in 1939: 1.343 million soldiers, 4,288 aircraft and 3,419 tanks.10
The might of the Red Army grew and Stalin, who had become disil-
lusioned with the abilities of Comintern in the second half of the 1930s, 
decided to change the policy that was to help him achieve his goal of 
a world revolution. This policy relied increasingly more on the idea of 
using weapons or threatening the use of weapons to export socialism. 
The intentions of the red dictator become clear in the speech he deliv-
ered to the members of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party 
(Bolsheviks) on the 19th of August 1939. Assessing the international situ-
ation, Stalin announced: “[---] the question of peace or war is reaching a 
critical phase for us. If we entered into a treaty of mutual assistance with 
France and England, Germany would give up Poland and start looking 
for a modus vivendi with the West. A war will have been prevented, but 
further events may be dangerous for the Soviet Union. If we accept Ger-
many’s proposal to enter into a pact of non-aggression, it will of course 
attack Poland and both France and England will then have to intervene. 
[---] In these conditions we have many chances to remain uninvolved in 
the conflict and we can hope for a favourable opportunity to enter the 
war. [---] The outbreak of a war in Europe will open a wide playing field 
for the Soviet Union to develop the world revolution. Therefore, it is in 
the interests of the Soviet Union, the homeland of workers, that a war 
breaks out between the Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French bloc. [---] 
We must do all we can to ensure that the war lasts as long as possible 
and exhausts those involved in it. [---] This is why we have to agree to 
enter into the pact offered by Germany and make sure that the war, once 
declared, lasts for as long as possible.”11 
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact or the Treaty of Non-Aggression 
between Germany and the Soviet Union gave Hitler the green light to 
attack Poland. The pact had a secret protocol, where the two imperialist 
states divided Eastern Europe into Nazi and Soviet spheres of influence. 
10 Мельтюхов, Упущенный шанс, 83.
11 Лев Лопуховский и др., Великая Отечественная катастрофа-3 (Москва: Яуза, 
Эксмо, 2008), 406–407.
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Finland, the Baltic States (except Lithuania) and the territory of Poland 
east of the Narew, Vistula and San rivers were entered into the Soviet 
sphere of interest. In return, Germany was given a safe opportunity to 
start a war against Poland, free hands to operate in Western Europe and 
a two-year contract for the delivery of strategic materials from the Soviet 
Union worth 180 million German marks, which was essential for Berlin.12 
If Stalin had told German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop on 
the 23rd of August 1939 that Germany would have the Soviet Union to 
deal with if it attacked Poland, the attack would probably have been called 
off and the Second World War would not have occurred. However, Stalin 
had his own issues with Poland – he hated that country. He had been in 
the Red Army when it went to conquer Poland in 1920 under the com-
mandment of Mikhail Tukhachevsky and was convincingly defeated by 
Marshal Józef Piłsudski. The Soviet leaders did all they could to encour-
age Germany to start the war by supporting it in any way they could, 
but not forgetting their own interests when Eastern Europe was divided 
into spheres of influence. According to those who were with Stalin when 
he signed the pact, he started dancing around after the German delega-
tion	had	been	ceremoniously	led	out	the	door,	and	rejoiced:	“I	deceived	
him. I deceived Hitler [---].” 13 Stalin really had deceived Hitler. Just two 
weeks after signing the pact, Hitler found himself engaged in a war on 
two fronts, i.e. in a situation where Germany was certain to lose the war.
 Germany attacked Poland on the 1st of September 1939. It’s known 
that Hitler feared a repeat of Germany’s sad experience from the First 
World War, i.e. a war on two fronts. However, the appeasement of the 
western countries in the Munich Agreement and their passivity dur-
ing his Sudetenland affair in 1938 had convinced Hitler that the United 
Kingdom and France would not start a war over Poland. This was later 
confirmed by several high-ranking German officials and military lead-
ers. For example, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop said: “Hitler did 
12 СССР – Германия 1939: Документы и материалы о советско-германских отношениях 
в апреле-сентябре 1939 г., кн. 1, сост. Юрий Фельштинский (Нью-Йорк: Телекс, 1983), 49, 
61–63.
13 Суворов, Ледокол; День «М», 53.
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not count on England starting a war over Poland.”14 One of the most tal-
ented commanders in the Reich, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, said: 
“Hitler was convinced that the West will once again decide not to grab 
its weapons at the deciding moment. He explained his opinion in great 
detail. [---]”.15 There are many witnesses who say that Hitler and the per-
sons close to him were shocked and dismayed after finding out on the 
3rd of September 1939 that the United Kingdom and then France had 
declared war on Germany. The leaders of the Third Reich knew that Ger-
many was not ready for a massive war against a coalition of countries and 
made several attempts to secure an armistice with England.
Stalin	 joined	 the	 Polish	 campaign	 on	 the	 17th	 of	 September.	 A	
620,000-strong Red Army group, supported by 4,800 tanks, despicably 




seized from Poland, where General Heinz Guderian, Commander of the 
XIX Army Corps of Germany, and Brigadier Semyon Krivoshein, Com-
mander of the 19th Light Tank Brigade of the Red Army, stood together 
on	 the	 podium	 as	 the	 hosts	 of	 the	 joint	 parade.16 The two totalitarian 
states shared the loot in a very brotherly manner. The Soviet forces were 
busy plundering the occupied territory until the 5th of October 1939. 
There are no exact figures, but it’s known that the 5th Army alone took 
64 locomotives, 70 passenger cars and 1,130 freight cars, 534 flat wag-
ons, 609 coal wagons, 104 tank wagons and large quantities of various 
goods (sugar, grains, flour, railway materials, iron, coal, horses, cattle, 
etc.) in 2,174 railway cars.17 The loot taken by the Red Army from the 
Polish Army consisted of more than 900 artillery guns, 10,000 machine 
14 Иоахим фон Риббентроп, Между Лондоном и Москвой: Воспоминания и последние 
записи (Москва: Мысль, 1996), 145.
15 Эрих фон Манштейн, Утерянные победы: Воспоминания фельдмаршала (Москва: 
ACT, 1999), 27.
16 General Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: Da Capo Press, 1996), 96.
17 Мельтюхов, Упущенный шанс Сталина, 132.
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guns, over 300,000 rifles, ca 300 aircraft, 19 tanks, over 150 million car-
tridges and a million artillery shells.18 The Germans captured 420,000 
and the Red Army 454,700 Polish soldiers.19 When it became apparent 
that most of the Polish officers captured as prisoners of war could not be 
used in the interests of the Soviet Union, 15,131 of them were shot by the 
NKVD in Katyn alone in spring 1940.20 Polish soldiers were also executed 
in many other Soviet prisons and prison camps at the same time. The 
winners formalised the final division of Poland on the 28th of September 
1939 during the second visit of the German Foreign Minister Ribben trop 
to Moscow to sign the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty. 
This treaty also had a secret protocol where the division of the spheres 
of influence was changed a little: Germany relinquished Lithuania to the 
‘Soviet	sphere	of	influence’	and	in	return,	received	the	province	of	Lublin	
and parts of the province of Warsaw in Poland.
This	 joint	 initiative	 of	 Hitler	 and	 Stalin	 is	 best	 characterised	 by	
the speech of Stalin’s right hand, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union 
Vyacheslav Molotov during the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR on the 31st of October 1939: “The rulers of Poland boasted about 
the strength of their state and the capacity of their army. It became appar-
ent that all that was needed was an initial attack of the German Army and, 
after that, the attack of the Soviet Army; in order to leave nothing of this 
monstrous bastard of the Treaty of Versailles. [---] As we know, neither 
the English nor the French guarantees helped Poland. We still don’t know 
what these guarantees were even about.”21 Molotov’s Schadenfreude was 
justified.	The	inactivity	of	the	western	countries	that	had	declared	war	on	
Germany on the third day after the start of the war was more than pecu-
liar. It was betrayal from Poland’s point of view. Colonel General Alfred 
18 Вячеслав Молотов, О внешней политике Советского Союза. Доклад представителя 
Совета Народных Комиссаров СССР и Народного Комиссара Иностранных Дел 
товарища В. М. Молотова на заседании Верховного Совета СССР: 31 октября 1939 года 
(Москва: Госполитиздат, 1939), 9.
19 Мельтюхов, Упущенный шанс Сталина, 132.
20 Наталья Лебедева, Катынь. Преступление против человечества (Москва: Прогресс, 
1994), 215–216.
21 СССР – Германия 1939: Документы и материалы, 116–117.
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Jodl, Chief of Operations Staff of the Supreme Command of the German 
Armed Forces, later admitted: “[---] we were never, not in 1938, not in 
1939, capable of withstanding concentrated attacks by these countries. 
The only reason that we were not defeated is that some 100 English and 
French divisions, faced by 23 German divisions in the West, remained 
totally inactive.”22 The state of Poland was wiped off the map of the world.
Speaking	 about	 the	 Führer,	 his	 ‘brother	 in	 arms’,	 Stalin	 said	 in	 his	
speech of November 1939: “As a result of his stupidity, Hitler gave us the 
chance to build bases against him  [---]. Economically, Hitler depends 
solely on us and we will direct his economy in such a manner that a 
revolution breaks out in the warring countries. A long war will lead to 
a revolution in Germany and France [---]. War will make Europe weak 
and an easy prey for us. People will accept any regime that comes after 
war. [---]”23 The next stage of Stalin’s plan was based on the assumption 
that Germany was going to attack the Western countries – France and 
the United Kingdom. The war was supposed to lead to long-term con-
flict between these countries, weakening the largest countries of Western 
Europe considerably and creating the opportunity for the Soviet Union to 
intervene. This would have been followed by a mission of the Soviet Red 
Army	to	the	West,	the	‘liberation’	of	Europe	from	the	so-called	capitalists	
and	other	 ‘bloodsuckers’,	and	the	establishment	of	Soviet	power	on	the	
continent. Stalin started implementing his plan with determination.
The Kremlin rushed to take over the loot it gained from the pact with 
Hitler. In September 1939, it was the turn of the three small Baltic States. 
Estonia became Stalin’s first target, as the Red Army needed a passage from 
the Gulf of Finland to the Baltic Sea, which was of strategic importance in 
the upcoming war. Finland and Estonia could close it with their coastal 
batteries if necessary. At first, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov came out 
with an ultimatum demanding that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania allow 
the Soviet Union to establish its bases and contingents of 20,000 to 25,000 
22 Василий Фомин, Фашистская Германия во второй мировой войне: сентябрь 1939 г. – 
июнь 1941 г. (Москва: Наука, 1978), 101.
23 Татьяна Бушуева, “…Проклиная попробуйте понять,” Новый мир, 12 (1994), http://
magazines.russ.ru/novyi_mi/1994/12/knoboz03.html (accessed 1.7.2014). 
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men in their territories. During his meeting with Estonian Foreign Min-
ister Karl Selter, he announced: “The Soviet Union needs to expand the 
security system of its state and in order to do this, it needs an exit to the 
Baltic Sea. If you don’t want to sign a treaty of mutual assistance with 
us, we will have to find other ways of guaranteeing our security, which 
may be considerably harsher and more complicated. Please don’t make 
the Soviet Union use force to achieve its goals.”24 A massive army group 
was concentrated on the borders of the Baltic States to support this claim. 
On the 26th of September 1939, the People’s Commissar for Defence of 
the USSR issued his command no. 043/op, which ordered the Chief of 
the Leningrad Military District to “forthwith start concentrating troops 
on the Estonian-Latvian border and to finish that operation on the 29th 
of September 1939. The following were prepared to act against Estonia: 
the Separate Rifle Corps of Kingissepp in the direction of Narva (35,448 
men and 243 tanks) and the 8th Army in the direction of Petseri-Tartu 
(100,797 men and 1,075 tanks). The 7th Army (169,738 men and 759 
tanks) was positioned on the border of Latvia and Lithuania faced the 3rd 
Army (193,859 men and 1,078 tanks). In total, the Red Army had concen-
trated 437,235 men and 3,635 tanks on the borders of the Baltic States by 
the 28th of September 1939.”25
The task of the troops operating in the direction of Estonia was “to 
deliver a powerful and decisive blow at Estonian troops”. This was to be 
done as follows:
a)  the Kingissepp Group had to rapidly advance on Rakvere, Tapa 
and Tallinn;
b)  the 8th Army had to destroy the enemy troops and advance on 
Tartu	and	further	on,	jointly	with	the	Kingissepp	Group	at	Tallinn	
and Pärnu, allocating one Armoured Brigade and the 25th Cav-
alry Division for protection of its wing in the direction of Valga 
should the Latvian troops come to assist the Estonian troops. 
They had to attack in the Valga-Riga direction;
24 Мельтюхов, Упущенный шанс Сталина, 179.
25 Ibid., 181.
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c)  the 7th Army had to secure the operations of the Leningrad Mili-
tary District from the Latvian border. In case the Latvian troops 
come to the assistance of Estonian troops, the 7th Army will 
advance, by a rapid and decisive strike along both banks of the 
Daugava River in the general direction of Riga.26
The Baltic States capitulated without resistance and agreed to sign the 
treaty of the bases. Estonia suffered further humiliation and guilt towards 
Finland when the Soviet Air Forces, in a serious breach of the treaty of 
the bases and the neutrality of Estonia, started bombing Finnish cities 
from its airfields in Estonia during the Winter War. The Baltic States were 
fully	occupied	under	the	threat	of	tanks	and	guns	in	June	1940.	A	‘social-
ist revolution’ was carried out in Estonia with the assistance of imported 
communists and under the leadership of Member of the Politburo of 
the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshe-
viks) Andrei Zhdanov. A puppet government approved by Zhdanov was 
handed the power. The next stage in the Soviet scenario was elections 
with no choice, which took place simultaneously in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania on the 14th and 15th of July. The puppet parliaments declared 
their countries Soviet republics and under the pressure of Moscow, rap-
idly adopted new constitutions that were copies of the one of the Soviet 
Union. The rapid sovietisation of the Baltic States followed, culminat-
ing	 in	 them	 ‘voluntarily	 joining’	 the	Soviet	Union	 in	 the	first	weeks	of	 
August 1940.27 
Terror was the most characteristic feature of Stalin’s system. It soon 
arrived in the Baltic States as well. Mass arrests started. Thousands of 
people were arrested for political reasons and executions by shooting 
started at the change of 1940 and 1941. The Red Terror culminated in the 
deportation carried out in 1941. The NKVD organised mass deportation 
of	‘enemies	of	the	people’	in	all	three	Baltic	States	in	the	early	morning	of	
the 14th of June 1941. 10,000 innocent people from Estonia, 15,000 from 
26 Ibid., 180.
27 Andres Kasekamp, Balti riikide ajalugu (Tallinn: Varrak, 2011), 163.
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Latvia and 18,000 from Lithuania were deported to Siberia in the course 
of this operation.28 Many of them never saw their homeland again.
The Soviet dictator’s luck ran out in Finland. High on his success in 
Poland and the Baltic States, Stalin decided to finalise the occupation 
of	the	small	country	Hitler	had	so	generously	‘donated’	to	him	with	the	
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. He was going to achieve this with four armies 
that had 425,640 men, 2,289 tanks, 2,876 artillery guns and mortars, and 
2,446 aircraft in 24 divisions. Finland managed to come up with 265,000 
men, 534 artillery guns, 26 tanks and 270 aircraft.29 According to plans, 
the operation of the Red Army that started on the 30th of November 1939 
was to end with the conquest of Finland three weeks later. It was sup-
posed	to	be	a	present	for	Stalin	on	his	60th	birthday,	which	was	‘officially’	
on the 21st of December 1939.30 The Soviet leadership was also planning 
the immediate sovietisation of Finland. In order to do this, they quickly 
established	a	pro-Soviet	puppet	government	in	the	resort	town	of	Terijoki	
which was headed by Secretary of the Executive Committee of Comintern 
Otto Ville Kuusinen. But the small and determined nation of 3.5 million 
put up a strong, cold-blooded resistance against the armed forces of the 
attacking Soviet empire, whose population was 172 million. The offensive 
of the Red Army was stopped and the war started to drag on. The Finns 
managed to defend their independence in a desperate fight in the Winter 
War, which lasted 105 days. The Red Army’s losses were huge. According 
to military historian Mikhail Meltyukhov, the losses of the Red Army in 
the Winter War were as follows: 131,476 men killed in action or missing 
in action (incl. 39,369 missing in action), 264,908 men wounded or sick 
(incl.	17,867	with	cold	injuries),	and	6,116	prisoners	of	war:	402,500	peo-
ple in total, although some Russian historians believe that even this num-
ber is not final. The unrecoverable losses of the Red Army in terms of wea-
pons and equipment were: 406 aircraft, 653 tanks and 422  artillery guns.31 
28 Ibid., 165.
29 Мельтюхов, Упущенный шанс Сталина, 153.
30 Historians (Edvard Radzinski et al.) confirm that Stalin was actually born on 6 (18) Decem-
ber 1878.
31 Мельтюхов, Упущенный шанс Сталина, 164.
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Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim writes in his memoirs that Fin-
land’s losses were 24,923 men killed in action, missing in action and dead 
of wounds, and 43,557 wounded, i.e. 68,480 soldiers in total.32 According 
to the calculations of Finnish historians Jari Leskinen and Antti Juuti-
lainen, the number of casualties was higher  – 26,662 people.33 Also, 
another 876 Finnish soldiers were captured by the Red Army as prisoners 
of war. This means that Finland lost 71,095  servicemen at most, i.e. ca 
one-fifth of their entire field army.
Germany’s military campaign in Western Europe started on the 10th 
of May 1940. The commanders of the French Army, still basking in the 
glory of winning the First World War and followers of outdated military 
doctrine, expected the Wehrmacht to act in a manner similar to the Schli-
effen plan of a couple of decades back, i.e. a strike from the north via 
the Netherlands and Belgium, and concentrated most of its troop in the 
northern part of the country. The British Expeditionary Forces were also 
stationed there. Paris did not worry about defending the eastern border. 
They were certain that the impenetrable Maginot Line, which had 35 
divisions and was ca 400 km long, 20–25 km wide and stretched from 
Basel to Luxembourg, would prevent any invasions by the German troops 
from the east. However, the young German generals who were inspired 
by the so-called deep operation and blitzkrieg strategy convinced Hit-
ler to launch an armoured offensive across the Ardennes mountains. 
The commanders of the French and British armies considered the lat-
ter impenetrable by armoured vehicles. The German Panzer Divisions 
moved quickly through the Ardennes and on the 13th of May, crossed 
the Meuse River at Sedan, on the right wing weakly defended by the allied 
forces, and headed towards the sea. The blitzkrieg of the Wehrmacht was 
extremely successful. General Heinz Guderian’s tanks reached Pas de Cal-
ais on the 20th of May, cutting off all the southern and southwestern com-
munication lines of the allied troops stationed in Belgium. On the 14th 
of June the German units were already in Paris. The British Expedition-
32 Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim, Mälestused (Stockholm: Välis-Eesti, 1952), 49, 112.
33 Talvesõda: 1939/1940. 105 päeva Soome rahva kangelaslikku võitlust, compiled by Jari Leski-
nen	ja	Antti	Juutilainen	(Tallinn:	Varrak,	2002),	770.
278 Ants Laaneots
ary Forces trapped in the besieged port of Dunkirk managed to evacuate 
their people by sea after Hitler gave a halt order to his troops but had to 
leave all of their equipment, heavy weapons and other materials behind. 
The armistice, which effectively marked the capitulation of France, was 
signed between Germany and France on the 22nd of June at Compiegne, 
in the same railway car where the armistice between the Entente and Ger-
many had been signed in 1918.34 The Vichy government, which was a 
puppet of the Germans, stepped into office in the unoccupied Southern 
France. Hitler now owned almost all of Europe.
Taking advantage of the fact that the Führer and his troops were busy 
occupying Western Europe, Stalin decided that it was also time for the 
Soviet Union to expand its territories. On the 23rd of June 1940 Soviet 
Foreign Minister Molotov told the German Ambassador in Moscow that 
the Soviet Union was planning the annexation of Bessarabia (Moldova) 
and Northern Bukovina, because Ukrainians were allegedly living in the 
latter. Moscow was expecting Germany to support this annexation. The 
territorial claims of the Kremlin were a complete surprise for the Ger-
mans. The shocked Führer had no choice but to give his consent, thereby 
effectively betraying his ally Romania. The military preparations of the 
Red Army for the occupation of these territories had started in 1940. The 
plan for invading Bessarabia was approved in Moscow on the 14th of 
June. The Southern Front of the Red Army was created for the campaign. 
It consisted of 32 infantry divisions, two motorised infantry divisions and 
six cavalry divisions; 11 tank brigades, three paratrooper brigades and 
30 artillery regiments. The units were stationed on the Romanian bor-
der immediately after the approval of the operation plan. The Red Army 
occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina on the 28th of June. This was imme-
diately followed by the NKVD’s repressions in the occupied territories. 
Approximately 30,000 people were taken from Moldova to Siberia and 
Kazakhstan during the mass deportations of the 12th–14th of June 1941, 
which were organised by Stalin.35
34 Базил Генри Лиддел Гарт, Вторая мировая война (Москва: Воениздат, 1976), 73–93.
35 The deportations were carried out in territories seized from Romania in summer 1940. 
The number therefore also includes the people deported from Northern Bukovina (pres-
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Stalin’s hunger for new territories was immense. In November 1940, 
the Soviet Union submitted its new proposals about the re-division of 
Eurasia to Berlin. They sought Hitler’s approval for the final solution of 
the	‘issue	of	Finland	in	the	Soviet	Union’s	sphere	of	influence’,	i.e.	occupa-
tion of the country; the establishment of a Soviet navy base in the Bospo-
rus or Dardanelles region; recognition of the entire area south of Batumi 
and Baku up to the Persian Gulf as an area of central territorial interests 
of the Soviet Union; and ensuring that Japan waived its concession rights 
to coal and oil on northern Sakhalin.36
One of the biggest myths that the contemporary neo-Stalinists are 
trying to sell to the world is that all the actions of the Red Army before 
the outbreak of war in June 1941 were defensive. Scientists (Mikhail 
Meltyukhov, Mark Solonin, Vladimir Beshanov, Valeri Danilov and oth-
ers) ascertained that the General Staff of the Soviet armed forces started 
planning a war against Germany as early as October 1939 and that this 
process lasted until the middle of June 1941. As we know, Hitler gave the 
order for the development of Operation Barbarossa, aimed against the 
Soviet Union, on the 21st of July 1940. The General Staff of the Red Army 
developed several variants of the strategic plan for its offensive against 
Germany. Unfortunately, historians have so far been unable to access the 
strictly confidential documents concerning the operation and instead 
have had to settle for the summaries of these documents prepared by the 
General Staff for Stalin and Molotov, but these summaries do contain the 
most important points of the military plans. The preparation of the mili-
tary operation plan was extremely confidential. It was handled by a small 
group of the leading officers of the Operational Directorate of the General 
Staff, incl. its Chief, Lieutenant General Nikolai Vatutin, and his deputies, 
ently Chernivtsi Oblast), which had been annexed to the Ukrainian SSR, and from Southern 
Bessarabia	 (Budjak,	 Izmail	Oblast	 from	 1940–1941	 and	 1944–1954,	 later	 the	 southern	 part	
of the Odessa Oblast). This operation did not concern Transnistria, the former Moldavian 
ASSR of the Ukrainian SSR. See: Павел Полян, Не по своей воле… История и география 
принудительных миграций в СССР (Москва: О.Г.И – Мемориал, 2001), http://www.memo.
ru/history/deport/index.htm (accessed 17.4.2014).
36 Марк Солонин, 23 июня. «День М» (Москва: Яуза, 2009), 487–488.
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Major	Generals	Aleksandr	Vasilevsky	(later	promoted	to	Marshal	of	the	
Soviet Union) and Andrei Anisov.
Work on the plan became particularly intense in the summer of 1940 
and in the second half of the year. Russian historian Mark Solonin claims 
that the first document about the plan of attack against Germany that 
was	made	public	during	Khrushchev’s	‘thaw’	was	the	“Presentation	of	the	
People’s Commissar for Defence of the USSR and the Chief of the Gen-
eral Staff of the Red Army to the Central Committee of the All-Union 
Communist Party (Bolsheviks), J. Stalin and V. Molotov about the funda-
mentals of the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in 
the West and the East from 1940–1941”.37 According to the presentation, 
the military operation plan prescribed Belarus-Warsaw and Belarus-East 
Prussia as the main directions of the strategic offensive of the Red Army. 
Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, People’s Commissar for Defence of the 
Soviet Union, was allegedly unhappy with the decision to carry out the 
main strike in the Belarus-Warsaw direction. He demanded an additional 
analysis and moving the main strike south, to Ukraine.
 In any case, the second, flexible variant of the strategic offensive plan 
was completed in the General Staff by the 18th of September 1940. This 
prescribed the application of the main forces of the Red Army in both the 
northern (Belarus) and southern (Ukraine) directions, depending on the 
situation at the time. These two aforementioned military operation plans 
became	known	as	the	‘northern	variant’	and	the	‘southern	variant’.	The	top	
commanders of the Red Army presented the plan to Stalin and Molotov 
on the 5th of October 1940. After the discussion that lead to the approval 
of the decision to strike the main blow of the operation in the southern 
or Ukrainian direction, the General Staff was ordered to lay down the 
details	of	the	plan.	The	amended	‘southern	variant’	was	approved	as	the	
main	one	on	14 October,	but	it	was	also	decided	to	prepare	the	‘northern	
37 Докладная записка наркома обороны и начальника Генштаба Красной Армии в ЦК 
ВКП(б) И.В.Сталину и В.М.Молотову «Об основах стратегического развертывания 
Вооруженных Сил СССР на Западе и Востоке на 1940–1941 гг.», Виктор Суворов, Марк 
Солонин и Андрей Буровский, Правда Виктора Суворова: Окончательное решение 
(Москва: Яуза Пресс, 2009), 46. 
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variant’  properly as well.38 The compilations of the detailed documents of 
both plans had to be completed by the 1st of May 1941.
However, work on the plan did not end here. The General Staff of 
the Red Army practiced both the northern and southern variant of the 
military operation plan in its strategic war games from the 2nd–6th and 
8th–11th of January 1941. In the first war game, the Red Army carried 
out its offensive from Belarus in the northwestern direction, i.e. towards 
East Prussia. The main direction of the strategic offensive in the second 
war game was from Ukraine to Southern Poland and then to Hungary 
and Romania in order to cut Germany off from its allies and main sources 
of raw materials and fuel. The games prescribed no defensive action for 
the troops in the future war. The Red Army’s offensive against East Prus-
sia failed in the course of the war game, but the northwestern direction 
proved to be a great success. The variant of Southern Poland, i.e. the 
southern variant, was finally approved as the main direction of the future 
offensive as a result of the war games.39 Army General Georgy Zhukov, 
who had been appointed the new Chief of the General Staff on the 1st 
of February 1941, started overseeing the specification of the documents 
of the military operation plan according to the results of the war games.
 The plan of the military campaign was finalised by the 15th of May 
1941. Historians learnt about its existence in the document “Considera-
tions of the Plan for Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the 
Soviet Union in the Event of War with Germany and Its Allies”, which was 
made	public	during	the	‘thaw’.40	The	‘first	strategic	task’	of	the	Red	Army	
according to the plan was to move the troops more than 300 km deep into 
the territory of German-occupied Poland, to crush the main troops of the 
Wehrmacht positioned there and to conquer Poland and East Prussia. 
The plan was to strike the main blow with the forces of the Southwestern 
Front from the Lviv region in Ukraine in the direction of Kraków-Kato-
38 Докладная записка наркома обороны и начальника Генштаба Красной Армии в 
ЦК ВКП(б) И.В.Сталину и В.М.Молотову «Об основах стратегического развертыва-
ния Вооруженных Сил СССР на Западе и Востоке на 1941 год № 103313», Мельтюхов, 
Упущенный шанс Сталина, 372.
39 Ibid., 372–373.
40 Солонин, 23 июня. «День М», 489.
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wice, and to cut Germany off from its southern allies. The Western Front 
that was located in Belarus in the north had to strike an additional blow 
with its left wing in the general direction of Siedlce–Dęblin to engage the 
Warsaw grouping of the Wehrmacht in battles and to support the South-
western Front in the destruction of the Lublin grouping. The planned 
duration of the operation was 30 days. The following forces of the Red 
Army were allocated for the performance of the task: 303 divisions (198 
infantry, 61 tank, 31 mechanised and 13 cavalry) in the army and 218 
aviation regiments in the Air Forces.41 The first strategic task of the offen-
sive was to be followed by the second, i.e. the conquest of Germany.
On the 5th of May 1941, Stalin delivered a speech to the best gradu-
ates of the higher military education institutions of the Soviet Union. His 
message was this: the Soviet Union is now strong and its armed forces 
are equipped with the newest technology and armament. The state has to 
move from a defensive policy to an offensive policy in order to guarantee 
its security. An offensive strategy, which is backed-up by the powerful 
military equipment of the Soviet Union, must be used against aggressive 
Germany. Stalin’s speech became the basis of the nationwide ideological 
work and propaganda that started immediately after its delivery and was 
aimed at preparing people for the impending war.
A meeting that lasted the entire day was held in Stalin’s office in the 
Kremlin on the 24th of May 1941. In addition to Stalin the meeting was 
attended by Foreign Minister Molotov; People’s Commissar for Defence 
Marshal Timoshenko; Chief of the General Staff Army General Zhukov; 
his First Deputy, Chief of the Operational Directorate Lieutenant General 
Vatutin; Chief of the Main Directorate of the Soviet Army Air Forces Lieu-
tenant General Pavel Zhigarev; commanders of all five military districts 
by the western border; and members of their military councils and air 
force commanders of the military districts. The meeting was extremely 
confidential. Existing information suggests that the plan for an offensive 
against Germany was discussed with Stalin one more time, after which 
he approved it. Commanders of the military districts, i.e. wartime fronts, 
41 Солонин, 23 июня. «День М», 491–492.
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were given explanations of their tasks and the necessary documents for the 
military operation plan.42 The plans were so confidential that the People’s 
Commissar for Defence Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhu-
kov sent a special directive to the commanders of military districts, which 
warned them that “you, the member of the military council (the political 
commissar – author’s note) and the chief of staff of the district are the only 
ones who can know”43 about the preparations for the pre-emptive strike.
The historians who have accessed the archived documents (M. Meltyu-
khov, M. Solonin, B. Sokolov, B. Petrov, V. Kiselyov, V. Danilov et al.) 
unanimously agree that all of the plans developed by the General Staff in 
1940 and 1941 were plans for strategic offensives, not defence. There was 
no strategic nor operational defence planning in the General Staff or else-
where, which means that there was no such thing as a strategic defence 
plan for the Soviet Union in 1941. Developing such a plan wasn’t even 
discussed before the start of the war on the 22nd of June 1941.
The subsequent events demonstrated that Soviet troops were con-
centrated and deployed in Ukraine and Belarus, the starting points of the 
offensive, according to the plan of the 15th of May 1941. All of these actions 
were shrouded in secrecy. The German intelligence had to be kept in the 
dark about the concentration of troops. The units moved to the border at 
night. Stalin demanded that the main means of transport of the troops – the 
railway – operate according to the usual peacetime regime, but this slowed 
down the deployment of new units. The Soviet Army had to finalise its 
preparations for the war by the 15th of July 1941. This meant that the war 
could start either in the second half of July or in the beginning of August.
The fact that the Red Army was preparing for a strategic offensive and 
there were no preparations for defence either at the strategic or the oper-
ational level was also convincingly confirmed by the placement of the 
Soviet troops on the 22nd of June 1941, exactly as prescribed in the ver-
sion of the operation plan of the 15th of May 1941. Five fronts formed on 
the basis of peacetime military districts were to take part in the operation:
42 Ibid., 179–180.
43 Виктор Суворов, Марк Солонин и др., Нокдаун 1941. Почему Сталин «проспал» удар? 
(Москва: Яуза Пресс, 2011), 196.
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•	 the	Northern	Front	(22	divisions)	against	Finland	whose	task	was	
to defend the Port of Murmansk, the city of Leningrad and the 
Kirov railway (Leningrad-Murmansk), and to guarantee full con-
trol of the Gulf of Finland. This meant that at least the southern 
coast of Finland had to be occupied;
•	 the	Northwestern	Front	(23	divisions)	in	the	Baltic	States	against	
East Prussia, whose task was to create a strong defence in the 
directions of Riga and Vilnius and on the western coast of the 
Baltic Sea, Saaremaa and Hiiumaa to prevent amphibious land-
ings by the enemy. Once the conditions were favourable, go on 
the offensive and conquer the Suwałki region, then strike a blow 
in the direction of Insterburg and Allenstein (now called Chern-
yakhovsk and Olsztyn), thereby forcing the enemy’s forces in East 
Prussia into battle;
•	 the	 Western	 Front	 (53	 divisions)	 in	 Belarus	 against	 northern	
Poland and the southern part of East Prussia. The task: take a 
defensive position on the right wing of own front and prevent the 
enemy’s offensives in the direction of Lida and Białystok. When 
the Southwestern Front goes on the offensive, use its left wing to 
strike in the general direction of Warsaw-Siedlce-Radom, crush 
the Warsaw grouping of the enemy and conquer Warsaw. This 
was	to	be	followed	by	joint	action	with	the	Southwestern	Front	to	
destroy the enemy’s grouping in the Lublin-Radom region, reach 
the  Vistula River and conquer Radom;
•	 the	Southwestern	Front	 in	Ukraine	was	the	strongest	(123	divi-
sions) and operated in the direction of the main strike of the 
operation. The task: besiege and destroy the main forces of the 
enemy positioned east of the Vistula River with concentric strikes 
by the armies of its right wing from the Lviv region. At the same 
time, crush the enemy’s forces in the Kraków and Sandomierz-
Kielce directions with a strike on the left wing from the Sieniawa-
Przemyśl-Lutowiska line, and conquer the Kraków, Katowice and 
Kielce regions. Thereafter, develop the offensive in the northern 
and northwestern directions to completely crush the northern 
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grouping of the enemy’s troops and conquer the entire territory 
of the German-occupied Poland and East Prussia;
•	 the	Southern	Front	(27	divisions),	formed	immediately	before	the	
start of the war on the basis of the Odessa Military District, had 
to carry out a defence operation against Romanian and German 
troops in the 700-km area it was covering and be ready to go on 
the offensive from the Chernivtsi and Chișinău regions to crush 
the right wing of the Romanian troops, conquer Iași and develop 
the offensive in the direction of Ploiești.44
The main forces of the two protagonists of the impending war, the West-
ern and Southwestern Fronts, were concentrated into two powerful strik-
ing fists: the northern one was located in Belarus not far from Białystok 
and the southern one in the Lviv region of Ukraine. A second strategic 
echelon consisting of 77 divisions was positioned behind the first stra-
tegic echelon of the Red Army.45 However, only 17–20 divisions reached 
the locations determined in the plan of the offensive by the 22nd of June 
1941. The Red Army hadn’t finalised the concentration of its troops yet. 
Whole armies from the second strategic echelon were still on their way.
Although Stalinist history speaks about the massive superiority of the 
German troops in June 1941, facts indicate otherwise. On the 22nd of 
June the Red Army had 190 divisions on the Western Front and consider-
ably more heavy weapons and equipment than the Wehrmacht: 15,687 
tanks compared to Germany’s 4,171; 59,787 artillery guns compared to 
Germany’s 42,601; and 10,743 aircraft compared to Germany’s 4,846. The 
Germans only outnumbered the Red Army in terms of personnel – the 
Red Army had 3,289,851 people, the Wehrmacht 4,306,800.46 The mas-
sive superiority of his forces in terms of heavy weapons and military air-
craft probably explains why Stalin was knocked for six by the shock that 
awaited him on the 22nd of June. He was certain that Hitler, well aware 
of the technical superiority of the Soviet troops, would not dare to strike 
44 Солонин, 23 июня. «День М», 489–491.
45 Ibid., 200.
46 Мельтюхов, Упущенный шанс Сталина, 478.
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first. However, the Führer knew both instinctively and based on intel-
ligence information that if he didn’t strike first, Stalin would do it soon. 
Hitler simply pre-empted Stalin by attacking on the 22nd of June 1941.
It was relatively easy for the Wehrmacht to break through on the 
wings of the Red Army’s combat forces, whose massive quantities of peo-
ple and technology were piled up in small areas of land and still prepar-
ing for their offensive, to surround them and destroy them or paralyse 
their resistance with air strikes and artillery gun fire. The attempts of the 
top leadership of the Red Army to implement the plan described above 
(as there was no other plan) and organise badly coordinated counterat-
tacks against the Germans with their massive mechanised and armoured 
forces, were completely inappropriate to the situation. They all failed. 
Soviet propaganda has spoken much about the patriotism of the Soviet 
people and their love of their fatherland. The conduct of the Red Army 
servicemen facing the German troops in the summer of 1941 revealed 
that they had no motivation to defend their homeland, which had been 
turned into a concentration camp by Stalin. Entire units of the Red Army 
let themselves be captured as prisoners by the enemy or simply scattered.
The situation on the fronts in September 1941 was so catastrophic 
that Stalin asked British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to send forces 
to assist the Red Army and to land 25–30 divisions in Arkhangelsk or 
bring them to the southern part of the Soviet Union via Iraq.47 
According	 to	 Russian	 historian	 (retired)	 Major	 General	 Vladimir	
Gurkin, the human losses of the two sides between the 22nd of June to 
the 31st of December 1941 were as follows:
•	 the	 Red	 Army:	 802,191	 killed	 in	 action;	 3,906,965	 missing	 in	
action (mainly prisoners of war and deserters – author’s note). 
Total: 5,979,134 people.
•	 German	 troops:	 273,816	 killed	 in	 action;	 802,705	 wounded;	
57,245 missing in action. Total: 1,133,766 people.48
47 Winston S. Churchill, The grand alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 462.
48 В. В. Гуркин, “О людских потерях на советско-германском фронте в 1941–1945 гг.,” 
Новая и новейшая история, № 3 (1992), http://vivovoco.astronet.ru/VV/PAPERS/HIS-
TORY/DEAD.HTM (accessed 1.7.2014).
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Common parade of Wehrmacht and Red Army in Brest at the end of the 
Invasion of Poland. At the centre Major General Heinz Guderian and 
Brigadier Semyon Krivoshein (22nd of September 1939). Heinz Guderian, 
Panzer Leader, 96. New York: Da Capo Press, 1996
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Propelled by the euphoria of his first victories, Hitler ordered a reorgani-
sation of the Wehrmacht as early as the 14th of July 1941 to prepare for war 
against England and the United States after crushing the Soviet Union.49 
The Führer’s grandiosity still prevented him from realising that the attack 
against the Soviet Union was his biggest mistake. Even if Operation Bar-
barossa had been a success, the 150–160 German divisions would never 
have been able to conquer this giant state and maintain control of its 22.5 
million square kilometre territory. Crisis hit the military campaign of the 
Third Reich in autumn 1941. In November, Germany was facing seri-
ous military and economic problems. Colonel General Friedrich Fromm, 
who was the Commander in Chief of the Reserve Army and had a com-
plete overview of the existing human resources and the situation in the 
military industry, reported to Hitler on the 25th of November that the 
state of the country’s military industry was catastrophic and advised him 
to sign an armistice as soon as possible. On the 29th of November 1941, 
Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition Fritz Todt told the Füh-
rer openly that the war had already been lost in military and economic 
terms. Ending the war in Germany’s favour was only possible with politi-
cal solutions.50 Then came Germany’s first big defeat under Moscow in 
December	1941.	The	Führer’s	‘Eastern	Campaign’	had	failed.
The huge Red Army was already standing on the banks of the Elbe 
and the Danube in April 1945. Stalin had completed a part of his plan 
to export the socialist revolution to Europe. We can only assume what 
might have happened in Europe if Stalin had managed to be the first to 
go on the offensive in 1941. The only serious obstacle he encountered 
was the Wehrmacht of Hitler’s Germany, the country that had fallen out 
with almost all Western European countries and the US. Otherwise, the 
western border of the great Soviet Union may have run along the eastern 
coast of the Atlantic.
*
49 Мельтюхов, Упущенный шанс Сталина, 513.
50 Клаус Рейнгардт, Поворот под Москвой: Крах гитлеровской стратегии зимой 
1941/1942 гг. (Москва: Воениздат, 1980), 219.
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Approximately 50 million people lost their lives in World War II. More 
than half of them – 27 million – were residents of the Soviet Union. The 
economies and infrastructures of tens of countries were destroyed. The 
main organisers of this catastrophe were Hitler and Stalin, the dictators at 
the head of two totalitarian states, both with ambitions to rule the world. 
The	 pathetic	 ‘non-intervention’	 and	 ‘appeasement’	 policy	 of	 the	 large	
countries of the West contributed to everything these two did to start 
the war. Whilst the defeated Germany had the guts and the integrity to 
admit its guilt and try to compensate the other nations for the suffering 
caused to them by the Reich, the Soviet Union and its successor Russia 
keep	 justifying	 the	 crimes	 committed	by	 Stalin	 and	his	 regime	 against	
neighbouring nations. Hitler and National Socialism were given a fair 
trial in international court and the world, but neither Stalin nor Stalin-
ism have been held accountable for their actions yet. The Russian nation, 
which suffered the biggest losses in the war, still hasn’t given a fair assess-
ment of his crimes either.
Looking at the authoritarian and quick-to-arm Russian Federation, 
intent on restoring the empire, and the complacent Western Europe, 
which	is	focussed	on	enjoying	the	good	life,	drowning	in	minute,	every-
day concerns and losing its defensive capability, we cannot help but 
wonder whether the events related to World War II could reoccur in the 
future. Will we be witnessing Munich No. 2, Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 
No. 2 or the second Yalta, where the fate of small countries is decided 
behind their backs? Can the potential aggressors of today be reined in? 
Does Europe have enough unity and desire for the practical implementa-
tion of  collective defence?
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